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SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR 
AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
TESTIMONY OF ACTING CHAIRMAN J. CLAY SMITH, JR. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT·OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION. 
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 
APRIL 21, 1981 
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I am J:: Clay Smith, Jr., Acting Chairman of the Equal 
' .. 
Employment Opportunity Commission. 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a five-member 
bipartisan C~ission having principal responsibility for the 
administration and en~orcement of Federal laws prohibiting 
~ 
discrimination. in employment, including Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Since the early days of our 
existence as an agency, we have recognized that harassment in the' 
workplace, whi~h is based on race, religion, national origin, 
color, or sex, constitutes a violation of Title VII be·cause it 
imposes an adverse term or condition of employment on one class 
of people which is not imposed on any- other classes of people. 
It unfairly handicaps and disadvantages those people against whom 
it is directed, often making it impossible for ·them to perform 
their jobs. While the Commission continues to actively oppose 
harassment in the workplace on any Title VII basis, I will limit 
my testimony today to harassment on the basis of sex which takes 
the form of sexual harassment. 
That sexual.narassment is widespread 1.s not to be denied. 
According to Lin Farley, the author of Sexual Shak,edown t "In May 
1975 the Women's Affairs Section of the Human Affairs Program at 
Cornell 'University "distributed the first questiJnnaire ever 
devoted solely to the topi~ of sexual harassment ... 70 percent 
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; (of the respondents had) personally experi~nced some. form of 
harassment". 11 In 1976, Redbook magazine published a question-
naire on sexual harassment to which over 9,000 women responded. 
Of this numbe1, one in ten report'ed t~at they had experienced 
unwanted sexuAL attentions on the job.2! Additionally, a statis-
tically significant st~dy conducted by the U.S'. Merit Systems 
Protection Board shows that during the two years prior to the 
survey, which was done in early 1980, 42 percent of .all federally 
employed women surveyed reported that they were vict~s of 
se~ual harassment.l1 Also during the late 1970's cases .involving 
sexual harassment were decided in six Federal Circuit Courts and 
~ 
seven additional cases were decided in Federal District Courts. 
In addition to this activity in the courts, in 1979 the 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on Post 
Office and Civil Service held hearings on sexual harassment in 
the Federal government. These hearings establi~hed that sexual 
harassment was widespread in the Federal government and established 
the need for guidance from our Commission with respect to this 
issue. The Commission realized, however, that any guidance which 
was issued with respect to sexual harassment would necessarily 
apply equally to all employers covered by Title VII, and we 
; 
further realized, from the activity in the courtfo, that both 
public and private employers were in need of help in understanding 
and defining their liability for acts of sexual harassment in 
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the workplace and were in need of help in determining' how to 
mitigate that liability. Therefore, the Commission decided that 
guidelines should b~ issued to give employers notice of the 
guidance and to give them an opportunity to comment along with 
other member, of the public and Federal agencies. Since guide-
.' 
lines are regularly published in the Federal Register for public 
notice and comment and .. are also regularly circulated to Federal 
agencies for comment, this format appeared to be the vehicle 
which would best serve the interests of all concerned. 
On April 11, 1980, the interim guidelines were published in 
the Federal Register for a 60 day period for public comment. In 
addition to the comments received from Federal agencies, the 
Commission received 168 letters in response to this publication. 
These comments came from persons throughout th~ public and private 
sectors. The single most prevalent group of comments took the 
form of praise for the Commission for publishing guidelines on 
the issue of sexual harassment and for the c~ntent of the guide-
lines. The Commission was gratified by this high degree of 
favorable response which the guidelines elicited, recognizing 
that this was an ~nusual phenomenon in recent Federal experience. 
The Final Guidelines were published in the Federal Register 
• 
November 10, 1980. I will discuss them now, se~tion-by-section. 
The first subs'ection of the guidelines' states that sexual harass-
ment is a violation of Titie VII and defines sexual harassment as 
follows: 
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Un~elcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature con-
stitute sexual harassment when (1) sub-
mi~ion to such conduct is made either 
ex~licitly or implicitly a term or condition 
of an individual's employment) 
(2) submission to or rejection of such 
conduct by an individual is used as the 
basis for employment decisions affecting 
such indiviudal, or (3) such conduct has 
t~e pu~ose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating~ 
hostile, or offensive working e.nvironment. 
A number of pe~sons who responded t9 the publication of the 
guidelines suggested that this definition of sexual' harassment 
.--
should be more specific both as a general proposition and as a 
means for strengthening the guidelines, particularly with regard. 
to §1604.ll(a) (3)., - the section which provides that, "Unwelcome 
sexual adyances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal 
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitut~ harassment 
. 
when ... such conduct- has the purpose or effect Jf unreasonably 
interfering with an indiv~dual's· work performance or creating 
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 
I 
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, 
" \ 
• r 
These comments were carefully considered by the Commission, and 
after much consideration, the Commission 4ecided that the defini-
tion should stand as written, with one word changed for the sake 
of clarity. This conclusion was based on two factors. First, 
the Commissiop has held in, its decisions that this definition is 
~ . . 
applicable in cases of harassment based on national origin', race, 
,. 
and religion, since 1968, 1969, and 1971, respectively 4/, and 
the courts have also recognized this form of harassment as discri-
minatory.~/ At this time, the Commission sees no justification 
for treating harassment based on sex any differently than harassment 
based on race, religion, color, or national origin, for we agree 
with the following statement contained in the report of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare when Title VII was 
amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972: II ••• 
discrimination against women is no less serious than other pro-
hibited forms of discrimination, and ... it is to be accorded the 
same degree of ~oncern given to any type of sim~larly unlawful 
conduct. lt§j One court recognized this specific form of sexual 
harassment prior to the issuance of the guidelines7/, and at 
least two courts have supported the definition since the guide-
lines were issued.S/ 
The second factor that played a part in the 1Commission's 
determination was the difficulty inherent in fr~ing a specific 
definition which does not include behavior which is perfectly 
acceptable social behavior and has no relevance at all to Title 
VII. This difficulty is due to the fact that tpe same actions 
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which, under one set of circumstances, would cons~itute sexual 
harassment, might, under another set of circumstances, constitute 
acceptable social behavior. Also, this is a developing area of 
the law, and the Commission wanted to give guidance without being 
so definitiv~ that the guidelines would require amendments with 
t 
each new development. Rath~r, as stated in Subsection (b) of 
~ 
the guidelines, the Commission will consider"each case alleging 
sexual harassment on a 'case-by-case basis and consider such 
. factors as the nature of the alleged 'sexual advances and the 
context in which they occurred. This way the Commission will be 
able to issue and publish fact-specific decisions and further' 
clarify and refine the definition through examples and dis~ussion 
contained in the decisions. 
Since the publication of the final guidelines in November 
1980, the Commission has issued three decisions.9/ We are 
current~y considering a fourth decision for issuance, and I have 
instructed staff to present additional decisions to the Commission 
for consideration so as to provide additional guidance for the 
public. These decisions all speak to areas of the guidelines 
which the Commission consi~ers appropriate for further development 
or explanation through the kind of discussion that is not possible 
in a set of guidelines but is necessary to the ~esolution of an 
I 
individual charge of discrimination. The Commission feels that 
well developed, fact-speci~ic decisions are the appropriate 
vehicles for further refining the definition of sexual harassment. 
-6-
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The guiaelines follow the well established common law 
standard of respondeat superior. That is, they state that an 
employer is responsible for the acts of its supervisors and 
agents. This responsibility exists regardless of the existence 
of circumstances which would be mitigating factors if the person 
. f 
who committed! the acts were not a supervisor or an agent, e.g. 
lack of knowledge of the acts on the part of the employer or 
publication 9£ a policy prohibiting the acts. This is the 
standard which the courts -have previously applied in all area·s of 
.. 
Title VII law. It is true that some courts failed to apply this 
standard in s~al harassment cases at the outset of the develop-
ment of this legal is-sue; however, it should be noted that some 
courts were initially slow to g~ant sexual harassment the same 
legal status as other Title VII issues on any front. 
Moreover, some courts did apply the respondeat superior 
doctrine prior to the issuance of the guidelines. For example, 
one court stated in 1976, "For, if this (sexual'harassment) was a 
policy or practice of the plaintiff's supervisor, then it was the 
(employer's) policy or practice, which is prohibited by Title 
VII "'1.Q./ 
In other early sexual harassment cases the courts concluded 
. 
that, " ... respondeat·superior does apply here, wiere the 
action complained of was that of a supervisor, authorized to 
hire, fire, discipline or promQte, or at least to participate in 
-7-
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or recommend such actions, even though what the supervisor 
~is said to h~ve done violates company policy"'ll/ and that·, 
'''Generally speaking, an employer is chargeable with Title 
VII violations occasioned by discriminatory practices of 
supe~isory personnel. "12l The comments which dealt with 
employer li4bility for acts of supervisors and agents were 
~ 
read in conjunction with court precedent and Commission 
policy in this and all other areas of Title VII law, and the 
·Commission concluded that. there was no justification for 
distinguishing the issue of sexual harassment from other 
Title VII issues. 
The application of the principle of respon~eat superior 
in Title VII law is -far less onerous than in other areas of 
law, such as tort law, because there are no provisions in 
Title VII for punitive or compensatory damages, either as 
money payable to the employee above an4 beyond that which is 
actually lost or as fines. This means that where an employer 
knows of acts of sexual harassment which have been committed 
by a supervisor or an agent and rectifies the actual results 
of those actions, a further remedy under Title VII would be 
unlikely in the administrative process. Clearly, the Commission 
would not sue for a remedy which has already been ~ranted. 
'J 
Let me, at this point, ~o back to the interim guidelines. 
As originally published, Subsection (d) of the guidelines 
provided that: 
With respect to persons other than those 
mentioned in subsection (c) above, (that 
is, ~upervisors and agents), an employer 
is responsible for acts of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace where the employer, 
or its agents or supervisory employees, 
kno*s or should have known of the conduct . 
. ! 
An. employer may rebut apparent liability 
for such acts by showing that it took 
immediate and appropri~te corrective action. 
The comments we received showed that we needed to clarify what we 
meant by our reference to "persons other than," and so we rewrote 
Subsection (d) and l~ited it to cover liability for sexual 
harassment by co-workers. We retained the provision that sets 
out the requirement for actual or constructive knowledge on the 
part of employer·and the provision for a defense which consists: 
of a showing that the employer took immediate and .appropriate 
corrective action when it discovered the violation. Then we 
added a new Subsection (e) to cover actions by persons who do not 
work for the employer, e.g., persons who regularly come to repair 
equipment or make deliveries at an employer's facility and harass 
an employee whil~ they are on the employer's premises. We also 
retained the requirement in this subsection that employers have 
knowledge before liability can vest 'and retainedlthe provision 
. J 
for a defense consisting of a showing of ~ediate and appro-
priate corrective action. In :~ddition, we expanded the pro-
~, 
visions of the original subsection to state that, "in reviewing 
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these cases the Commission will consider the extent of the 
employer's control and any other legal responsibility which the 
employer mig~t have with respect to such non·-employees. It Clearly, 
control is a~given in the case of an employee, but is not neces-
sarily present in the case of a non-employee and must be esta-
blished .in order to establish a violation. However, where both 
knowledge and control do exist on the part of the employer', there 
is an obligation under Title VII for the employer to maintain an 
atmosphere that is free of sexual harassment, so that members of 
one sex are not required to work under different and less advan-
tageous terms and conditions of employment than' members of the 
other sex. 
In connection with these two subsections, some commentors 
were concerned with what constitutes "appropriate corrective 
action." If the action is "corrective," that is, if it in fact 
eliminates the illegal behavior, then it is appropriate; however, 
actions which result in the elimination of the illegal behavior 
in one workplace might not have the s~e result in another work-
place. Since appropriateness will have to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis,. we did not make any changes ~n the original 
language. I 
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Subsection (f) of the guidelines provides that: 
Prevention ·is the best tool for the elimin-
ation of sexual harassment. An employer 
should take all steps necessary to prevent 
sexia1 harassment from occurring, such as 
~ . 
affirmatively raising the subject, expressing 
strong disapproval, developing appropriate 
sanctions, informing ~p~oyees of their right 
to· raise and how to raise the issue of harass-
ment under Title VII, and developing methods 
to sensitize all concerned. 
This" subsection: contains the maj or thrust of· the guidelines, 
that is "Prevention is the best tool for the el:i.mination of 
sexual harassment." The suggestions offered in" this subsection 
give employers assistance in preventing an invidious form of 
discrimination that inflicts substantial psycho~ogical damage to 
its victims, in addition to the monetary damage that it inflicts. 
It. is most. important when considering the issue of sexual harass-
ment that we bear. this psychological damage in mind and recognize 
that, while it is·difficult to remedy, it can, in many cases, be 
prevented." 13/ 
. 
Some commentors requested greater specificity with respect 
to the examples of preventative action which an employer might 
take. The Commission decided that it would not go beyond making 
the suggestions which were already set out in the guidelines. We 
do not want to require that employers take previously determined 
steps to prevent sexual harassment because the Commission feels 
that each workplace is unique, and steps which might be effective 
in one workplace might fail in another. The cost factor was also 
considered. An extensive formalized training program might be 
effective and appropriate in a large corporation, but a less 
expensive, info~al means of communicating the employer's concerns 
to managemenl and the employees might be more efficient and 
effective in a 'small business. I have also made both the 
Commissioners and staff available, within budget constraints, to 
speak to trade associations and other employer and employee 
groups to give furt~er examples and to discuss ideas which 
members of the groups have for preventing sexual harassment. 
Several people who submitted written comments and a large 
number of members of the public who telephoned ~he Co~ission 
asked whether employees who are denied an employment benefit are· 
covered by the guidelines when the benefit is received by a 
person who is granting sexual favors to their mutual supervisor. 
While we realize that this. does not state a case of sexual 
~arassment, since we assume that the employee who received the 
benefit is granting the sexual favors willingly and has not been 
coerqed into the ~elationshipJ it is· obviously· relate·d to that 
issue in the minds of the public~ Therefore, the Commission 
decided to add a new subsection, Subsection (g), to the guidelines 
to alert employers that this related issue is aJso covered by . 
Title VII. This does not mean, and we did not state, that this 
necessarily presents a vioiation of Title VII. It merely means 
that the charge is cognizable under Title VII and, if brought to 
the Commission, will be decided under that statute. 
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It· is important to understand that th~s provision affords 
protection for persons who are not involved in the situation but 
who, nevertheless, are adversely affected by the sexual conduct 
of others. Thus, it creates a balance of protection for all 
persons in t~e workplace. 
f 
One criticism of the guidelines which was raised by a 
limited number of commentors during the formal comment period but 
which has been raised f~equently since the guidelines became 
final is that they will cause an influx of frivolous charges at 
EEOC. All charges that are filed in our field offices which 
involve· the-issue of sexual harassment are investigated in the 
field and then sent in to Headquarters for a decision on the 
merits by the Commission. I instructed staff to read through all 
of the. case ~iles which are currently in Headquarters and to give 
me a sense of the contents of those cas.e files. The following is 
the result of their reading. 
There are currently 130 sexual harassment charges in Head-
quarters. Of these, 118 contain corroborative evidence that 
. 
substantiates part, if not all, of the Charging Party's allega-
tions. The evidence comes in the forms of admissions by Respondent, 
statements of people who witnessed the sexual aqvances, statements 
! 
of others subjected to the same or similar cond~ct as Charging 
Party, and other statement~ of corroboration. 
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These cases, which will be decided on the merits, cover a 
wide range of acitivity as demonstrated by the following: fifty-
eight of these charges involve unwelcome physica~ contact of a 
sexual nature, such as the touching of a person's buttocks or 
hugging or k~ssing; seventy-seven involve demands for a person to 
! 
~ngage in a sexual act and the promise of a favorable employment 
decision if the demand is met or the threat of a negative action 
if the' demand is not met; and twenty-six involve the use of 
vulgar language of a sexual nature, calling a person sexual~y 
derogatory names, making sexually derogatory comments about one 
sex, or displaying sexually explicit pictures, photographs, or 
cartoons. 
From another point of analysis, seventy-one of the charges 
were brought by women who were fired; twenty-six were brought by 
women who resigned when the unwelcomed sexual activity became 
intolerable; nineteen were brought by women who either were given 
less desirable work assignments, had their number of hours of 
work reduced, or were transfered to a different work shift; seven 
were brought by women who were denied a promotion; ana seven were 
brought by women-who were subjected to sexual activity which 
interfered with their work performance or create? an off~nsive 
working environment. 
In the 118 charges wh~ch were corroborated, the acts of 
sexual harassment were perpetrated by supervisors or other 
management officials in 106 cases and by coworkers in 12 cases . 
. i 
.' 
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In conclusion, sexual harassment in the workplace .is not a 
figment of the imagination. It is a real problem. The sexual 
harassment guidelines are designed to' assist employers in their 
understanding of this sensitive public issue and to guide them in 
I developing management training programs for their companies, and 
.the .Federal government. 
T~nk you. 
j. 
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